Uncertainty and the General Interest in the American Constitution: Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice
- 20 February 2015
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 85-101
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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