Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
Author:
- 1 July 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 64 (1) , 89-99
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
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