Auditing, directorships and the demand for monitoring
Authors:
- Don AndersonDADon Anderson
- Jere R. FrancisJFJere R. Francis
- Donald J. StokesDSDonald J. Stokes
- 1 December 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 12 (4) , 353-375
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
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