Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure
- 20 December 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 60 (4) , 599-608
Abstract
This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure (CEPR DP No. 7240, IGIER WP No. 393)
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2010-15052)
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