Helping or Hurting? How Governing as a Junior Coalition Partner Influences Electoral Outcomes
Authors:
- Heike KlüverHKHeike Klüver
- Jae-Jae SpoonJSJae-Jae Spoon
Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 82 (4) , 1231-1242
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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