Improved Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Submodular Valuations: Beating 4 Deterministically in Linear Time
- 1 May 2026
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 21-38
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
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