Facility location with double-peaked preferences
Open Access
- 20 March 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- Vol. 31 (6) , 1209-1235
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- European Research Council (ERC Advanced Grant 321171 (ALGAME))
- Strategiske Forskningsråd (Center for Research in Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM))
- Statens Naturvidenskabelige Forskningsrad (61061130540)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (61361136003)
- Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee (CityU 117913)
- European Commission (FET Proactive IP Project number 317532)
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