WHAT DOES REPUTATION REALLY ASSURE? THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRADEMARKS TO EXPECTATIONS AND LEGAL REMEDIES
Authors:
- Louis De AlessiLALouis De Alessi
- Robert J. StaafRSRobert J. Staaf
- 1 July 1994
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 32 (3) , 477-485
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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