Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- 1 February 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 175 (2) , 441-456
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- Core-selecting package auctionsInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2007
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy ImplementationEconometrica, 2006
- A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents2006
- Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies2006
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharingTheoretical Computer Science, 2003
- Ascending Auctions with Package BiddingFrontiers of Theoretical Economics, 2002
- Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents2001
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic InfluenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public GoodsEconometrica, 1977
- Multipart pricing of public goodsPublic Choice, 1971