On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k
Open Access
- 1 July 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 86, 102-125
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (BO 747/8, BR 4648/1)
- ESRC (ES/K002201/1)
- Nottingham University Business School
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