Hilbert's Epistemology
Author:
- Philip KitcherPKPhilip Kitcher
- 1 March 1976
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 43 (1) , 99-115
Abstract
Hilbert's program attempts to show that our mathematical knowledge can be certain because we are able to know for certain the truths of elementary arithmetic. I argue that, in the absence of a theory of mathematical truth, Hilbert does not have a complete theory of our arithmetical knowledge. Further, while his deployment of a Kantian notion of intuition seems to promise an answer to scepticism, there is no way to complete Hilbert's epistemology which would answer to his avowed aims.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the philosophical significance of consistency proofsJournal of Philosophical Logic, 1974
- Mathematical TruthThe Journal of Philosophy, 1973