Incommensurability
Author:
- 1 January 1983
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 26 (1) , 3-29
Abstract
The thesis that certain competing scientific theories are incommensurable was introduced by Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962 and has been a subject of widespread critique. Critics have generally taken incommensurable theories to be theories which cannot be compared in a rational manner, but both Kuhn and Feyerabend have explicitly rejected this interpretation, and Feyerabend has discussed ways in which such comparisons can be made in a number of his writings. This paper attempts to clarify the incommensurability thesis through the examination of a number of examples, both scientific and nonscientific, of cases in which incommensurable points of view compete. There follows a discussion of Kuhn's analogy between paradigm change and gestalt shifts, the ways in which incommensurable theories can be compared, and one key reason why the incommensurability thesis has been so often misinterpreted by its critics.Keywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science. By Harold I . BrownThe Modern Schoolman, 1979
- The Justification of Scientific Change1971
- Discussion Kuhn on Scientific RevolutionsPhilosophy of Science, 1967
- The Structure of Scientific RevolutionsPhilosophical Review, 1964