The Soft Law of the Covenant: Making Governance Instrumental
Authors:
- 1 November 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of Industrial Relations
- Vol. 11 (3) , 367-384
Abstract
Covenants are agreements between the government and social partners to implement public policy. They are a form of soft law, guiding the regulation of self-regulation, and are specifically relevant in bridging the macro and meso levels of society. Covenants prove effective where actors share goals, and learn to advance policy-making by monitoring efforts, effects and possible risks, and by subsequently fine-tuning follow-up actions. Positive-sum outcomes often result. We describe successful examples of this method of cooperation in the realm of working conditions and employment, and claim that covenants can be helpful in facilitating collective-bargaining framework agreements. In terms of EU policies, covenants are an instance of so-called European Governance Arrangements, the political and institutional foundations of which are still to be developed.Keywords
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