Vertical collusion between airports and airlines: An empirical test for the European case
Authors:
- Cristina BarbotCBCristina Barbot
- Tiziana D’alfonsoTDTiziana D’alfonso
- Paolo MalighettiPMPaolo Malighetti
- Renato RedondiRRRenato Redondi
- 1 October 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
- Vol. 57, 3-15
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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