Motivations Of Public To Private Transactions: An International Empirical Investigation
Open Access
- 15 December 2014
- journal article
- Published by Clute Institute in Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Vol. 31 (1) , 1-16
Abstract
This article contributes to the financial literature by investigating the motivations of Public to Private transactions in an international perspective (Europe, USA and Asia). We consider seven main possible motivations: tax savings, incentive realignment, control, free cash-flow, growth of prospects, takeover defense and undervaluation. Our empirical findings suggest that low growth prospects, low liquidity and high free cash-flow are the three main motivations for a Public to Private transactions. However, regions show some particularities such as importance of family block-holders in Europe and importance of the level of taxation in Asia.Keywords
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