The U.S. Supreme Court Is Not a Dahlian Court
- 26 August 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Studies in American Political Development
- Vol. 36 (2) , 148-150
Abstract
Robert Dahl's “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker” has long enjoyed pride of place within American politics scholarship, especially among regime theorists. However, Dahl's views of the U.S. Supreme Court are no longer defensible. It is essential for our field to move beyond “Decision-Making in a Democracy” in order to better theorize and explain the modern Supreme Court.Keywords
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