Agenda setting, vetoes and the european union's co‐decision procedure
Authors:
- 1 September 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies
- Vol. 3 (3) , 74-92
Abstract
(1997). Agenda setting, vetoes and the european union's co‐decision procedure. The Journal of Legislative Studies: Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 74-92.Keywords
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