Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Authors:
- Michael ZuckermanMZMichael Zuckerman
- Ariel D. ProcacciaAPAriel D. Procaccia
- Jeffrey S. RosenscheinJRJeffrey S. Rosenschein
- 1 February 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 173 (2) , 392-412
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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