Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance
Author:
- 1 January 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 25 (2) , 437-454
Abstract
The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.Keywords
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