Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization
- 2 October 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Review of Radical Political Economics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 492-515
Abstract
Financialization is studied here from a microeconomic viewpoint. Following Stockhammer (2004a), the theory of the firm has been amended by introducing agency problems and class analysis between shareholders and managers. Further to that, I propose two alternative configurations for incorporation into the theory: the first views financialization as a constraint for the managerial firm, while the second discusses shareholders’ interests and integrates them as an end in itself for the finance-dominated firm. My conclusions focus on finance-oppressed accumulation, financial fragility, and potential macroeconomic instability. JEL classification: D21, E12, G30Keywords
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