The Electoral Sweet Spot in the Lab
- 1 August 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 3 (1) , 75-83
Abstract
Carey and Hix (2011) propose that a proportional electoral system with a moderate number of seats per district offers the best compromise between (1) accurate representation and (2) strong accountability. The argument is that there is a district magnitude (DM) level where the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation of parties is optimal. This DM is called the sweet spot. We explore this proposition through lab experiments conducted in Brussels and Montreal. We find that the probability of achieving a “good” outcome on both proportionality and the number of parties is slightly higher at moderate DMs. We note, however, that this probability remains low.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral SystemsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 2011
- z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 2007
- Expert opinion on electoral systems: So which electoral system is “best”?Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 2005
- Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New EvidencePolitical Analysis, 2000
- Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspectiveElectoral Studies, 2000
- Democracy and Elections1997
- A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political ContextAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1993
- Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systemsElectoral Studies, 1991
- The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85American Political Science Review, 1990
- “Effective” Number of PartiesComparative Political Studies, 1979