In an approval-based committee election, a committee of size k is selected from a set of candidates to represent voters of total weight n, each of whom has positive weight and approves a subset of the candidates. A size-k committee is λ-stable if, for every nonempty subset T of candidates, the total weight of voters who strictly prefer T is less than λ times the proportional share n|T |/k. Whether there exists a committee that is exactly stable, corresponding to λ = 1, remains a major open problem in approval-based committee voting. Thus, a natural objective is to identify small values of λ > 1 for which λ-stability can always be guaranteed. We prove that weighted sequential Phragmén, a classical and natural rule, always returns a 2-stable committee of size k. Since the λ-core is the set of all λ-stable committees, our result implies that the 2-core is always nonempty. This improves upon the previously best-known guarantee, due to Gao, Sun, and Vondrák [EC 2026], that a 3.651-stable committee always exists.