A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting
Author:
- Mark HinchliffMHMark Hinchliff
- 1 January 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 67 (S3) , S575-S586
Abstract
Presentism is the view, roughly speaking, that only presently existing things exist. Though presentism offers many attractive solutions to problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, it faces threats from two main sources: McTaggart and the special theory of relativity. This paper explores the prospects for fitting presentism together with the special theory. Two models are proposed, one which fits presentism into a relativistic setting (the cone model) and one which fits the special theory into a presentistic setting (the surface model). It is concluded that there is no good reason arising from the special theory of relativity for rejecting presentism. Presentism is tenable here and preferable elsewhere.Keywords
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