Central Bank Digital Currency and Gresham's Law: An experimental analysis
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Abstract
In a monetary system where risky and risk-free money coexist, Gresham's law predicts that people will hoard the risk-free money as a store of value and spend the risky money as a medium of exchange. The establishment of a payment system based on risk-free money, such as a retail CBDC, therefore seems doomed to failure. A laboratory experiment confirms this prediction. When the holding of risk-free money is not restricted, people hold and pay with risk-free money extensively. However, when the holding of risk-free money is limited by a ceiling or an unattractive interest rate, people mainly pay with risky money but hoard risk-free money.Keywords
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