Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners’ incentives affect us?
Authors:
- Adriana AlventosaAAAdriana Alventosa
- Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
- Penélope HernándezPHPenélope Hernández
- 1 May 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 185, 513-537
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Generalitat Valenciana
- Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
- European Commission
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