Financial Intermediation, International Risk Sharing, and Reserve Currencies
Author:
Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2017
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 107 (10) , 3038-3071
Abstract
I model the equilibrium risk sharing between countries with varying financial development. The most financially developed country takes greater risks because its financial intermediaries deal with funding problems better. In good times, the more financially developed country consumes more and runs a trade deficit financed by the higher financial income that it earns as compensation for taking greater risk. During global crises, it suffers heavier losses. Its currency emerges as the reserve currency because it appreciates during crises, thus providing a good hedge. I provide evidence that financial net worth plays a crucial role in understanding this asymmetric risk sharing. (JEL E44, F14, F32, G01, G15, G21)Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 43 references indexed in Scilit:
- International currency exposures, valuation effects and the global financial crisisJournal of International Economics, 2015
- Financial Intermediaries and the Cross‐Section of Asset ReturnsThe Journal of Finance, 2014
- SOVEREIGNS, UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS, AND GLOBAL IMBALANCESJournal of the European Economic Association, 2014
- A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial SectorAmerican Economic Review, 2014
- Exports and Financial ShocksThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011
- Do Peso Problems Explain the Returns to the Carry Trade?The Review of Financial Studies, 2010
- An Equilibrium Model of “Global Imbalances” and Low Interest RatesAmerican Economic Review, 2008
- The importance of nontradable goods’ prices in cyclical real exchange rate fluctuationsJapan and the World Economy, 2006
- Quantitative Asset Pricing Implications of Endogenous Solvency ConstraintsThe Review of Financial Studies, 2001
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of DefaultEconometrica, 2000