Housing Supply Elasticity and Rent Extraction by State and Local Governments
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- 1 February 2017
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Vol. 9 (1) , 74-111
Abstract
Governments may extract rent from private citizens by inflating taxes and spending on projects benefiting special interests. Using a spatial equilibrium model, I show that less elastic housing supplies increase governments’ abilities to extract rents. Inelastic housing supply, driven by exogenous variation in local topography, raises local governments’ tax revenues and causes citizens to combat rent seeking by enacting laws limiting the power of elected officials. I find that public sector workers, one of the largest government special interests, capture a share of these rents through increased compensation when collective bargaining is legal or through corruption when collective bargaining is outlawed. (JEL H71, H72, J45, J52, R31, R51)Keywords
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