Efficient tournaments within teams
Authors:
- 15 January 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 40 (1) , 103-119
Abstract
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first‐best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions.Keywords
This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
- Optimal rewards in contestsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2008
- When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law FirmsJournal of Labor Economics, 2007
- Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional PartnershipsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005
- The Professional Partnership: Relic or Exemplary Form of Governance?Organization Studies, 2003
- The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in ContestsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- Contest success functionsEconomic Theory, 1996
- The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation ratesPublic Choice, 1994
- Multiple Signals, Statistical Sufficiency, and Pareto Orderings of Best Agency ContractsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1989
- Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982
- Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1981