Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Authors:
Open Access
- 1 September 2010
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 100 (4) , 1826-1846
Abstract
Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)Keywords
This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
- Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience EffectsEconometrica, 2009
- The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental ApproachAmerican Economic Review, 2007
- Incentives and Prosocial BehaviorAmerican Economic Review, 2006
- Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairnessEconomic Theory, 2006
- What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator gamesOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2006
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple TestsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for AltruismEconometrica, 2002
- ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and CompetitionAmerican Economic Review, 2000
- Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving BiasesJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1997
- Commitment and observability in gamesGames and Economic Behavior, 1995