The mixed-strategy $\alpha $-core of games with infinitely many pure strategies
- 28 June 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of the Operations Research Society of China
- Vol. 13 (2) , 660-670
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- the Innovation Exploration and Academic New Seedling Project of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics (2022XSXMB22)
- Guizhou Key Laboratory of Big Data Statistical Analysis ([2019]5103)
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