Environmental policy innovations in China: a critical analysis from a low-carbon city
Author:
- 13 March 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 27 (5) , 830-851
Abstract
The Chinese state is squarely ‘back’ in the business of environmental governance with an increasing number of policy innovations or experiments to resolve environmental issues. These have been mostly enacted through the ‘experimentation under hierarchy’ framework, undergirded by compensation-for-performance incentive structures for local agents. Based on on-site ethnography in local China, a critical analysis is presented of low-carbon city policy experiments – one of the most prominent environmental policies introduced in the past decade. Using lessons from the agency theory, it is hypothesized that outcomes of these policy innovations are contingent on different policy dimensions. Although a number of positive outcomes have been achieved in output-oriented dimensions, the fundamental difficulty of specifying all aspects of complex, multidimensional work tasks involved in low-carbon city development has frequently led to policy unmaking. The findings raise important questions about China’s tendency to rely excessively on compensation-for-performance structures to promote environmental policies.Keywords
Funding Information
- Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (N/A)
- Blakemore Foundation (N/A)
- Institute of International Education (N/A)
- U.S. National Security Education Program (N/A)
- MIT-Japan International Studies Fund (N/A)
- U.S. Department of Education (N/A)
- U.S. Department of State (N/A)
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