Refusing the Devil's Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?
Author:
- P. Kyle StanfordPSP. Kyle Stanford
- 1 January 2001
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 68 (S3) , S1-S12
Abstract
Advocates have sought toprovethat underdetermination obtains because all theories haveempirical equivalents.But algorithms for generating empirical equivalents simply exchange underdetermination for familiar philosophical chestnuts, while the few convincing examples of empirical equivalents will not support the desired sweeping conclusions. Nonetheless, underdetermination does not depend on empirical equivalents: our warrant for current theories is equally undermined by presently unconceived alternatives as well-confirmed merely by theexistingevidence, so long as this transient predicament recurs for each theory and body of evidence we consider. The historical record supports the claim that this recurrent, transient underdetermination predicament is our own.Keywords
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