Political Favoritism and Audit Fees: The Effect of Stock Ownership by Members of the US Congress

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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of political favoritism on audit fees using a large sample of publicly traded US firms. We hypothesize that political favoritism, measured as stock ownership by the members of US Congress, influences auditor’s perception of inherent risk, litigation risk, and agency costs, thereby leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between political favoritism and audit fees. The results are robust to controlling many firm-level and audit-related characteristics, addressing endogeneity, and omitted variable bias concerns using the Oster test, propensity score matching, and entropy balancing techniques. The empirical results show that politically favored firms pay approximately 13.66 percent higher audit fees than non-favored firms. This paper extends the literature on the role of political economy in financial reporting and auditing by documenting political favoritism as the stock ownership of US Congress members and evaluating its effect on audit fees.