Are there such things as merely possible people, who would have lived if our ancestors had acted differently? Are there future people, who have not yet been conceived? The book argues for positive answers to these and similar questions about contingency and change, applying the technical resources of modal logic to provide structural cores for metaphysical theories. The search for a metaphysically neutral logic is rejected as futile. There is detailed historical discussion of how the metaphysical issues emerged in the twentieth-century development of quantified modal logic, through the work of such figures as Rudolf Carnap, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Arthur Prior, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker, Alvin Plantinga, and Kit Fine. Higher-order modal logic is proposed as a new setting in which to resolve such metaphysical questions scientifically, by the construction of systematic logical theories embodying rival answers and their comparison by normal scientific standards, more specifically by abduction (inference to the best explanation). The book provides a rigorous introduction to the technical background—for example, concerning possible worlds semantics for modal logic and the interpretation of higher-order quantifers—needed to understand metaphysical questions in modal logic, as well as an extended argument for specific answers to them. A view is reached on which there is no contingency or change in what there is, only in how it is.