How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
Authors:
- Sergiu HartSHSergiu Hart
- 1 May 2010
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 69 (1) , 107-126
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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