Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
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Open Access
- 1 May 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 55 (2) , 297-320
Abstract
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This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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