Cournot and bertrand equilibria under imperfect information
Author:
- 1 September 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 213-232
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Information Sharing in OligopolyEconometrica, 1985
- Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria: A Geometric ApproachThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1985
- Collusion and the Incentives for Information SharingThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
- Duopolists don't wish to share informationEconomics Letters, 1983
- Strategic Information TransmissionEconometrica, 1982
- Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and ReleaseThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982
- Equilibria of price-setting and quantity-setting duopoliesEconomics Letters, 1979
- A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry BarriersThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Informational properties of the Nash solutions of two stochastic nonzero-sum gamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1974
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic ModelManagement Science, 1967