Kernel extension verification is untenable
Open Access
- 22 June 2023
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 150-157
Abstract
The emergence of verified eBPF bytecode is ushering in a new era of safe kernel extensions. In this paper, we argue that eBPF's verifier---the source of its safety guarantees---has become a liability. In addition to the well-known bugs and vulnerabilities stemming from the complexity and ad hoc nature of the in-kernel verifier, we highlight a concerning trend in which escape hatches to unsafe kernel functions (in the form of helper functions) are being introduced to bypass verifier-imposed limitations on expressiveness, unfortunately also bypassing its safety guarantees. We propose safe kernel extension frameworks using a balance of not just static but also lightweight runtime techniques. We describe a design centered around kernel extensions in safe Rust that will eliminate the need of the in-kernel verifier, improve expressiveness, allow for reduced escape hatches, and ultimately improve the safety of kernel extensions.Keywords
Funding Information
- NSF (National Science Foundation) (CNS-2236966, CNS-1956007)
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Sound, Precise, and Fast Abstract Interpretation with Tristate Numbers2022
- PKRU-safe2022
- Verified programs can party2022
- An incremental path towards a safer OS kernel2021
- Simple and precise static analysis of untrusted Linux kernel extensions2019
- The eXpress data path2018
- System Programming in Rust2017
- Extensibility safety and performance in the SPIN operating system1995