The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice
Authors:
- Asher A. BlassABAsher A. Blass
- Dennis W. CarltonDCDennis W. Carlton
- 1 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 44 (2) , 511-524
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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