ESTIMATING THE RIVALNESS OF STATE‐LEVEL INWARD FDI
Open Access
- 8 January 2014
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 55 (1) , 139-148
Abstract
We develop a method for estimating the rivalness of tax bases using the structures of the conditional logit, Poisson, and nested logit models. As an illustration, we apply this method to estimate the effect of state‐level capital taxation on U.S. inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The assumption of perfect nonrivalness can in some cases be rejected, but the assumption of perfect rivalness cannot. Competition over FDI across U.S. states could well be a zero‐sum game.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Barcelona Institute of Economics
- Swiss National Science Foundation (130648, 147668)
- NCCR “Trade Regulation”
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