Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
Authors:
- Sam BucovetskySBSam Bucovetsky
- Andreas HauflerAHAndreas Haufler
- 1 January 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 74 (1) , 188-201
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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