Bilateral Bargaining with One-Sided Two-Type Uncertainty
Authors:
- Bo AnBABo An
- Nicola GattiNGNicola Gatti
- Victor LesserVLVictor Lesser
- 1 January 2009
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 2, 403-410
Abstract
It is a challenging problem to find agents’ rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. In this paper we perform a game theoretic analysis of agents’ rational strategies in finite horizon bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices. The negotiation setting considered in this paper has four features: alternating-offers bargaining protocol, finite horizon, two-type uncertainty about agents’ reserve prices, and discount factors. The main contribution of this paper is the development of a novel algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in the setting we study. Our algorithm is based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibriumGames and Economic Behavior, 2008
- Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithmArtificial Intelligence, 2007
- Multi-Issue Negotiation with DeadlinesJournal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2006
- Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games2006
- Negotiation decision functions for autonomous agentsRobotics and Autonomous Systems, 1998
- Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers CaseOperations Research, 1988
- Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating OffersReview of Economic Studies, 1987
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time PreferencesEconometrica, 1985
- Sequential EquilibriaEconometrica, 1982
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelEconometrica, 1982