Why Party Leaders are More Extreme than Their Members: Modeling Sequential Elimination Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives
Authors:
- 1 December 2002
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 113 (3-4) , 337-356
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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