Abstract
Internet auctions have become an integral part of Elec- tronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an ex- cellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must con- sider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Double auctions are an important subclass of auction protocols that permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a good, and have been widely used in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incen- tive compatible. On the other hand, if we consider the pos- sibility of false-name bids, the PMD protocol is no longer dominant-strategy incentive compatible. In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant- strategy incentive compatible even if participants can sub- mit false-name bids. The characteristics of the TPD proto- col is that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.