Contract Duration and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Land Tenancy Agreements
- 1 September 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 5 (5) , 953-986
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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