Why less is more: exploring affect‐based value neglect
Authors:
- 24 March 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Risk Research
- Vol. 13 (4) , 399-409
Abstract
Previous research indicates that the affective nature of the problem context can override gains in the evaluability of risk attributes brought on by side‐by‐side comparisons of two problems. Specifically, in a joint evaluation, an affect‐rich problem will be given greater management preference than an affect‐neutral problem even when the risk is significantly greater for the neutral problem. A series of new experiments were conducted to explore the relevance of this concept (i.e., affect‐based value neglect) for the evaluation of two affect‐rich problems. Consistent with previous research, the results indicated no preference for either problem evaluated in isolation, given that both the affective impression and the level of risk were hard to evaluate. Again, consistent with previous research, there was no preference for either problem in a joint evaluation when the difference in risk between the two problems was small (one problem posing 1.5‐times greater risk than the other). However, when the risk difference was large – 3‐times greater – preference was given to managing the higher‐risk problem. Additional evidence indicates that joint evaluations may increase the significance of probabilities as a form of risk communication, and that increased availability of one problem may dominate both initial affective impressions and the presentation of risk attributes.Keywords
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