Effects of expectation and noise on evolutionary games
Authors:
- Wen-Bo DuWDWen-Bo Du
- Xian-Bin CaoXCXian-Bin Cao
- Mao-Bin HuMHMao-Bin Hu
- Han-Xin YangHYHan-Xin Yang
- Hong ZhouHZHong Zhou
- 1 June 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 388 (11) , 2215-2220
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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