The Unbundling Regime for Electricity Utilities in the EU: A Case of Legislative and Regulatory Capture?
Preprint
- 1 May 2007
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies which used to be and here are referred to as Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is generally believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is tantalizing anecdotal evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through questionable means of persuasion. Such means of persuasion should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states (EU-15), countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the new EU member states that acceded in 2004 (NMS-10). We provide a conjecture for this observation.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Monitoring competition in the telecommunications sector: European Commission Sector Inquiries2004
- Vertical Restructuring of the Infrastructure Sectors of Transition EconomiesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
- Regulation, industry structure and performance in the electricity supply industryOECD Economic Studies, 2001
- The causes of corruption: a cross-national studyJournal of Public Economics, 2000
- Corruption, Growth, and Public FinancesIMF Working Papers, 2000
- Corruption and GrowthThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995
- Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Cross-Sectional Dependence and Heteroskedasticity in Financial DataJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1989