Safeguarding Common-Pool Resources in Transition Economies: Experimental Evidence from Central Asia
- 22 August 2012
- journal article
- agriculture and-rural-development
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Development Studies
- Vol. 48 (11) , 1683-1697
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the propensity to cooperate in common pool resource dilemmas is higher for small, homogeneous groups with efficacious monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Given that transition from socialist to market economies is associated with larger, more heterogeneous groups with diluted opportunities for monitoring and sanctioning, individuals in later-stage transition economies may be expected to be less cooperative than their early-stage counterparts. However, evidence from experiments conducted with subjects in two economies at different stages of transition suggests that this may not be the case. These findings have implications for both theorists and practitioners alike.Keywords
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