Defending Against Stealthy Attacks on Multiple Nodes With Limited Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
- 8 May 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 7 (4) , 1665-1677
Abstract
Stealthy attacks have become a major threat for cyber security. Previous works in this direction fail to capture the practical resource constraints and mainly focus on one-node settings. In this paper, we propose a two-player game-theoretic model including a system of multiple independent nodes, a stealthy attacker and an observable defender. In our model, the attacker can fully observe the defender's behavior and the system state, while the defender has zero feedback information. Further, a strict resource constraint is introduced to limit the frequency of the attacks/defenses for both players. We characterize the best responses for both attacker and defender under both non-adaptive and adaptive strategies. We then study the sequential game where the defender first announces its strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly. We have designed an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender and provided a full analysis of its complexity and performance guarantee.Keywords
Funding Information
- NSF (CNS-1901057)
- ONR (N00014-17-1-2417)
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (HDTRA1-14-1-0058)
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