Abstract
Stealthy attacks have become a major threat for cyber security. Previous works in this direction fail to capture the practical resource constraints and mainly focus on one-node settings. In this paper, we propose a two-player game-theoretic model including a system of multiple independent nodes, a stealthy attacker and an observable defender. In our model, the attacker can fully observe the defender's behavior and the system state, while the defender has zero feedback information. Further, a strict resource constraint is introduced to limit the frequency of the attacks/defenses for both players. We characterize the best responses for both attacker and defender under both non-adaptive and adaptive strategies. We then study the sequential game where the defender first announces its strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly. We have designed an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender and provided a full analysis of its complexity and performance guarantee.
Funding Information
  • NSF (CNS-1901057)
  • ONR (N00014-17-1-2417)
  • Defense Threat Reduction Agency (HDTRA1-14-1-0058)